Rising international bank financing to developing countries has motivated a debate on the behavior of these claims. We analyze seven home (lender) countries' claims on ten host (borrower) countries in Latin America. We find that banks transmit shocks from their home countries and changes in their claims on other countries spill over to individual hosts. However, lending has become less "indiscriminate" and more responsive to host conditions over time. The responsiveness to the latter becomes less "pro-cyclical" as exposure increases. Finally, foreign bank lending reacts more to positive than to negative host shocks and is not significantly curtailed during crises.
1 International bank claims refer to the BIS definition of consolidated international claims of BIS reporting banks (internationally active banks in BIS reporting countries) which includes all claims funded in a BIS reporting country but lent in a developing country and claims funded and lent in a developing country in foreign currency through a BIS reporting bank. BIS reporting countries in 2000 are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and US. 2 Private sector credit refers to credit provided by banks operating in the developing world (both foreign and domestic). Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.economic events in Japan that, in turn, affected the U.S. commercial real estate sector. Focusing on the behavior of U.S. bank claims (cross-border and locally funded) on a number of regions including Latin America since the mid-1980s, Goldberg (2001) finds that U.S. economic conditions affected U.S. bank foreign lending. However, she also finds that U.S. bank foreign lending was unaffected by economic conditions in host (borrower) countries and that U.S. banks did not retrench their lending significantly following international financial crises. Dages et al. (2000) focus on the local lending behavior of all foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico over the late 1990s. They argue that foreign bank penetration did not increase financial sector instability by showing that foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico exhibited stronger and less volatile loan growth than domestic banks between 1994 and 1999, i.e. during and after the Tequila crisis. Peek and Rosengren (2000b) reach a similar conclusion by examining the behavior of direct (or cross-border) foreign lending and local claims from foreign banks on Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil over the period 1994 . Finally, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000 examine a panel of BIS data on flows to 30 emerging markets disaggregated by 11 banking centers, to test the role of bank lending in transmitting currency crises. They find that bank exposures to a crisis country help predict bank flows in third countries after the Asian crisis, and to a lesser extent the Mexican 1994 crisis.
The papers discussed above make specific contributions to the debate regarding the behavior of foreign banks. However, each study concentrates on a narrow set of issues and/or covers a limited number of home (lender) and host (borrower) countries. In this study, we employ a comprehensive data set on international bank claims across a wide range of home and host countries over a fifteen year period to revisit some of the issues examined by previous studies, and to explore questions that have not been investigated previously. Our dataset, provided by the BIS, covers international bank claims from the seven most important lenders to Latin America (i.e., Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.) among the countries that report statistics to the BIS to the non-bank private sector in the ten largest borrowers in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), over the period 1985-2000. 4 We choose to focus our study on Latin America for a number of reasons. First, foreign banks had an active presence in this region since the beginning of our sample and, as noted above, it is now one of the regions with the strongest foreign bank presence. Second, while for the region as a whole foreign bank lending has increased in recent years, there are still differences in the extent to which countries depend on this source of funds. For example, international bank lending (cross-border or direct foreign lending and local lending in foreign currency) in 2000 represented more than 55 percent of domestic credit for Argentina and Peru, but it only accounted for 19 percent of domestic credit for Brazil. Third, the region has experienced considerable shocks (positive and negative) during the period of study. We, therefore, think that Latin America's experience over the last 15 years offers a unique opportunity to analyze the determinants of foreign bank lending.
Foreign banks provide financing to developing countries in at least two ways. First, they provide direct (or cross-border) financing from their headquarters and affiliates outside the developing world. Second, they establish operations (branches and subsidiaries) in developing countries and provide financing with local funding. In this paper we analyze the behavior of 'international bank (or financial) claims' as defined by the BIS. In other words, our main variable of study includes direct foreign lending (from outside host countries to local institutions) 4 The data on the sectoral breakdown of lending by banks in specific BIS countries to individual borrower countries is not normally published and was provided to us by the BIS with explicit authorization from each of the relevant central banks.
in any currency plus local claims in foreign currency from subsidiaries or branches of BIS reporting banks from the 7 home countries located in the 10 host countries mentioned above.
Claims extended from a local subsidiary or branch but funded by another part of the same BIS reporting bank, located outside of the host country, are consolidated. This definition of foreign lending represents a compromise. On the one hand, we might have chosen to work with a narrower definition including only the direct foreign lending from outside our host countries.
However, this would have left out completely the growing trend of foreign banks investing in brick and mortar operations in our host countries and extending loans locally. On the other hand, we could have attempted to include all local claims including those funded in local currency.
Unfortunately, the data on local claims in local currency to the private sector is not available. Furthermore, there are a number of reasons why including these claims might not be appropriate. First, it is not clear how much such claims add to the 'exposure' of a foreign bank.
Local deposits that fund local lending of foreign banks' brick and mortar operations can be thought of as a hedge against currency and possibly even against sovereign risks. Second, we wish to focus on those aspects of foreign bank operations that are distinct. The local currency operations of foreign banks are the operations most likely to resemble those of local banks. As we are interested in assessing the behavior of banks that are characterized by access to an international pool of liquidity, including claims extended in local currency does not appear appropriate for that goal. For these reasons, we adopt 'international financial (or bank) claims' as a reasonable measure of foreign bank lending and note that this definition has moreover become something of a standard in the industry 5 5 It might also be argued that local foreign currency deposits (funding local foreign currency claims) are more likely to be owned by non-residents and hence should be included as part of the 'international pool of liquidity' available to foreign banks whereas local currency local claims are less likely to be owned by non-residents. Finally, it is also worth noting that, although the local currency local claims of BIS reporting banks have been growing in Latin America, they remain well below 50 percent of total foreign claims (i.e., total claims to the private and public sector) Also, due to a number of factors we limit our study to claims on the non-bank private sector as opposed to total claims. First, we want to abstract from political or strategic considerations that might affect lending to governments. Second, it is likely that while the vast majority of private sector claims are loans, claims on the public sector are mostly more liquid bonds. End of year stocks for the latter may then not necessarily be representative of exposure and the BIS data does not control well for credit risk mitigation techniques such as derivatives.
While this might also be a problem for private sector claims, we feel that this problem is minimized in this case.
Using this dataset on international bank lending, we attempt to address a wider set of issues than previous studies regarding foreign bank behavior and the 'stability' of their claims.
In particular, we seek to answer the following questions: (1) do foreign banks transmit shocks from their home countries? (2) Do portfolio adjustments spill over to individual host countries? (3) How do foreign banks respond to positive and negative shocks? (4) Do foreign banks retrench their lending during crises in host countries? (5) How does the level of exposure affects banks' responsiveness to shocks in host countries and, in particular, do banks become more or less pro-cyclical as exposure levels rise? (6) Do increases in local presence by foreign banks (through brick and mortar operations) affect their reaction to home and host shocks? (7) Is the responsiveness of foreign banks to different types of shocks similar across lenders?
In examining the determinants of foreign bank lending we not only include standard home and host country variables (like growth rates, risk ratings, and interest rates), but also we test for the significance of other factors. For example, some models of portfolio allocation show that under standard rules of portfolio choice an unexpected decline in the value of one or more and so adopting the definition of international financial claims as described in the text captures the majority of foreign bank lending operations. assets may provoke a portfolio adjustment across the board. 6 Applying this result to our context, some shocks might then result in an 'indiscriminate' change in the claims on a particular host country and a positive relation between changes in the whole international lending portfolio and changes in claims on any one country. To examine the impact of overall international portfolio changes on the claims to an individual host country, we include as an explanatory variable the change in claims to all countries other than that individual host.
We also investigate whether the extent and type of exposure to a particular country is important in explaining the change in claims. One view might be that the greater the exposure of an international bank to a particular country, the more pro-cyclical its lending behavior might become. This might be the case for example for a bank that is not highly diversified. However, an alternative view is that as a bank's exposure to a country grows, the bank has more incentives to learn about the home country conditions and hence not to respond so strongly to signals of good or bad future events 7 . We investigate the role of exposure on the responsiveness to shocks in two ways. First, we interact host growth, changes in host risk ratings, and the indicator for crises in host countries with a measure of bank exposure to test whether lenders that are highly exposed to a country react less to domestic shocks in that country. Secondly, because in the second half of the 1990s there was an increase in brick and mortar operations of foreign banks in
Latin America, we test whether there are differences in the behavior of foreign banks over time,
as the nature of their exposure to this region changed.
Finally, we incorporate specifications that allow us to test for two types of asymmetries in the responsiveness of foreign bank lending to shocks. First, we test whether all lenders respond similarly to shocks by testing whether it is valid to pool across lenders. Secondly, we allow the reaction of foreign banks to shocks to depend on whether these are positive or negative.
Our empirical estimations allow us to corroborate, for a larger combination of home and host countries, over a relative long period of time, some of the results found by other studies. In particular, like Peek and Rosengren (2000a) and Goldberg (2001) , we find that home country conditions (i.e., conditions in the country where foreign banks' headquarters reside) are important in explaining changes in private sector claims. Also, consistent with other studies we find that foreign bank lending does not retrench during crises in the host countries (see Dages et al. (2000) , Peek and Rosengren (2000b) , Goldberg (2001) ).
More importantly, our work yields interesting new results. First, while foreign banks across lender country appear to react similarly to host country shocks, the magnitude of their reaction to shocks in their own countries is different. Second, lending to individual host countries is affected by changes in claims to other countries. Third, the higher the overall exposure of home country banks to a given host country, the less responsive are those banks' claims to host country shocks. Fourth, as brick and mortar operations become more important over time, foreign banks' reaction to external and portfolio shocks is diminished. Finally, we uncover asymmetries regarding foreign banks' response to positive and negative shocks, given that banks appear to respond more to the former than to the latter.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the data used in this paper. Section III presents the empirical methodology. Section IV describes the empirical results.
Finally, Section V concludes.
asset and hence react more strongly to 'signals' on expected return or risk. This suggests that as foreign banks become more exposed to a particular host country, they react less to changes in host country variables.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main dataset used in this study is the consolidated international banking statistics provided by the BIS. 8 The data reported by the BIS include direct (cross-border) foreign lending in all currencies (i.e. claims funded in a BIS reporting country but lent outside that country irrespective of currency denomination) plus all local claims in foreign currency (i.e., claims funded in a non BIS reporting country and lent locally in foreign currency through an affiliate of a BIS reporting bank). The principal balance sheet items included in the claims that we study are loans and advances to the private sector as well as holdings of securities and participations. be compared across countries. Therefore, it is not obvious that greater guarantees in a country with poor legal systems translate into less exposure relative to other countries where such guarantees are not offered. Having described the pattern and importance of foreign bank lending to Latin America, Table A .1 lists these episodes for each of the ten Latin American countries in our sample and provides the definition and sources used to identify them. 12 Rather than comparing the behavior of domestic credit vis-à-vis foreign lending during all types of crises combined, Table A .2 reports similar statistics distinguishing between currency, banking, and twin crises. In terms of percentages, domestic credit falls by more, on average, than foreign bank lending during banking and twin crises. The reverse is true during currency crises. However, as shown in Table A .3, these differences in means are not statistically significant.
deviation of changes in credit) than claims from BIS reporting banks in these seven home countries, both during host crisis, and during tranquil periods. 13 There is some evidence of transmission of portfolio shocks: the volatility of BIS claims is higher than volatility of domestic credit during the Asian crisis, although as can be seen from Table 1 only the U.S. reduced its claims on Latin America during that period. In fact, when we consider the Russian crisis episode, the volatility of BIS claims is significantly lower than the volatility of domestic credit.
In general these statistics suggest that there is no systematic evidence that international financial claims are less "stable" than credit originated locally. However, this is only partial and descriptive evidence and needs to be verified with a more careful empirical approach, which we undertake next.
III. Empirical Methodology
We estimate equation (1) below to examine the determinants of foreign bank lending and in particular, to investigate the role of home, host, and portfolio shocks, as well as the impact of exposure on banks' responsiveness to shocks 14 : Table A .3 shows that the volatility of domestic credit is statistically higher than that of foreign bank lending for currency and twin crises. 14 Alternatively, we could estimate a separate regression for each home (lender) country, using Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regressions method, to account for contemporaneous cross-equation correlation in the error terms. As a robustness check, we estimated separate equations for each lender and compared those results to the results from estimating Equation 1. The differences are not significant, and, furthermore, the drawback to the SUR method is that it forces our data into a balanced panel, significantly reducing the number of observations. where j=1 to 7 identifies banks from each of the seven BIS home (lender) countries, i=1 to 10 indicates each individual Latin American host (borrower) country and t=1985 to 2000 refers to the time period considered. 15 %
is the percentage change in real claims from banks in home country j to the private non-banking sector in host country i between t-1 and t. As explained above, we use consolidated international financial claims as defined and supplied by the Bank for International Settlements.
Among the host country variables, we include the real GDP growth, the change in country risk rating and a crisis indicator. We interact these variables with a measure of exposure to examine the responsiveness to host shocks as exposure increases.
In principle, given the importance of foreign lending to the region, changes in such claims could affect the host country right hand side variables (e.g.: host real GDP growth, timing of crises, and credit rating) implying a potential endogeneity problem. We believe that the concern regarding endogeneity is perhaps overstated since our estimations focus on bilateral lending flows (i.e., changes in real claims from home country j on host country i) and no bilateral relationship seems important enough to warrant such concern. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix illustrate that when expressed as either a percentage of domestic credit or as a percentage of total BIS lending to each host, these bilateral lending shares are relatively small. Nonetheless, as a precaution, all right hand side variables are lagged one period.
RGDPGR i,t-1 refers to the lagged growth rate (or percentage change) of host country i real GDP. These figures come from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Exposure i,t-1 represents the ratio of country j claims on country i over the total claims extended by country j during the period t-1. This ratio is calculated from the BIS consolidated banking statistics. %∆Rating i,t-1 is the lagged percentage change in credit rating reported by Institutional Investor Magazine for host 15 The U.K. is the exception where data on private sector claims are only available for the period 1993-2000. country i. 16 Crisis i,t-1 is a dummy variable which equals one if host country i had a crisis (banking, currency, or both) in period t-1. A chronology of crises in the region was obtained from Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and Bordo et al. (2001) . 17 Because foreign bank claims are reported in dollars, we also control for changes in the exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar for each home and host country.
Home real GDP growth and real interest rates are also included to control for home country shocks. RGDPGR allow the coefficients to vary depending on the home country or lender (this explains the j superscript in all coefficients). 18 However, it is possible that different lenders react similarly to host and even home country shocks. Below, we test different restricted versions of equation (1) to arrive at a final specification that constrains the impact of certain variables to be the same across home and host countries.
Home country economic conditions could have both a negative or positive impact on foreign bank lending to host countries. On the one hand, adverse economic conditions and a lack 16 Institutional Investor Magazine publishes a semi-annual survey of country credit ratings. The magazine surveys bankers, money managers, and economists around the world on their evaluations of the relative risk of countries to which they lend. On the basis of their responses, they produce a rating from 0 to 100, with higher numbers representing a better repayment capacity. 17 See Table A .1 for a list of crises in each host country during 1985-2000. of profit opportunities at home could encourage banks to lend abroad. If this were the case, we would expect to find a negative coefficient on home growth. On the other hand, a recession at home could lead to a deterioration in the capital of foreign banks and an overall retrenchment in lending at home and abroad. We therefore remain agnostic regarding the sign of this variable.
While we are interested in whether our results are in line with those obtained by other researchers, given our cross-country dataset and analysis we are also interested in whether different home country banks behave in a similar fashion or not with respect to home growth.
Low real interest rates in lender countries tend to signal periods of excess liquidity and portfolio theory would suggest that this would increase banks' willingness to lend via riskier, higher interest rate loans to developing countries. During these episodes, foreign banks are more likely to search for lending opportunities abroad. Therefore, we expect home real interest rates to have a negative impact on the change in claims.
Foreign banks are less likely to extend credit abroad if the riskiness of the host country
worsens. An increase in risk (lower host growth or a rating downgrade) should then lead to a rebalancing within the loan portfolio away from the affected country. Hence, we expect to find a positive coefficient on growth and rating.
A priori, we might expect banking, currency, and/or twin crisis episodes in a particular host country to be accompanied by a decline in foreign bank lending, since these episodes are typically associated with a fall in the capacity of crises-stricken countries to repay their obligations. On the other hand, foreign banks might view crises in host countries as an opportunity to expand their operations and increase their market share locally. Also, crises might coincide with a deterioration in economic fundamentals like GDP growth making their impact 18 We could have also allowed coefficients to vary by host country i but since host country dummies were not individually significant we decided against this.
indistinguishable from other cyclical downturns. In other words, it is possible that the crisis dummy in our regressions may not be significant because the impact of these episodes is being captured by changes in GDP growth. This in turn would suggest that crises are not perceived as different from any other cyclical downturn in output.
As we discussed above, shocks to the value of an asset or assets within the lending portfolio of foreign banks, may result in a reduction (or increase, depending on the type of shock) across all risky claims. Adapting this idea to our application, we should then find a positive and significant coefficient relating the change of claims on country i from country j banks to the change in all other claims of country j banks.
Following Calvo and Mendoza (2000) , if country j banks have a higher exposure to country i, then they should have greater incentives to learn and hence should provide more stable financing. To test this proposition, we include the interactions of the change in rating, the real growth, and the crisis indicator for host country i, respectively, with the exposure of country j banks to country i. A priori, if indeed higher exposure is translated into more stable financing, we expect these interaction terms to be opposite in sign to that of the host country shock. For example, we expect the interaction between host growth (or changes in host rating) and exposure to be negative and the interaction between host crisis and exposure to be positive.
To deepen our understanding of the determinants of foreign bank lending, we estimate some modified versions of equation (1). First, we examine whether banks' responsiveness to shocks depends on the type of shock by allowing the coefficients in equation (1) to vary depending on whether the change in host real GDP, host rating, and the change in all other claims is positive or negative 19 . Also, because in the late 1990s, foreign banks increased their lending on-shore relative to the previous decade and this might have affected how banks respond to home and host shocks, we estimate equation (1) over both sub-samples (1985-94) and (1995-2000) and examine whether banks' responsiveness to home and host variables changed over this period.
Finally, in order to summarize the importance of home country, host country, and portfolio shocks, we report for each estimation the percentage of the variance of claims explained by each of these factors. To the extent that home country and portfolio shocks, dominate host country shocks, we would be inclined to conclude that foreign banks facilitate the transmission of external shocks.
IV. Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the unrestricted version of equation (1), where the coefficients on all variables are allowed to differ across home or lender countries. In general, all banks respond positively to improvements in host country economic conditions, such as an increase in real GDP growth and an upgrade in the credit risk rating. In particular, these factors are significant in the case of Japan, Spain, and the U.S.. Also, foreign banks tend to increase their lending abroad when opportunities at home dwindle. This is illustrated by the negative sign on home growth across all lenders, except Japan. Home growth is negative and statistically significant for France and the US. Tighter monetary conditions at home result in less lending abroad, as shown by the negative coefficients on home real interest rates. Yet, this variable appears to be significant only for Japan. Like Goldberg (2001), we find that controlling for other factors reflecting host economic conditions, crises in host countries do not lead to reductions in lending across the board. The sign on this coefficient varies depending on the lender or home country, but this variable is never significant. In general, a shock to the rest of the portfolio is transmitted to individual host countries in Latin America. This is illustrated by the positive coefficient on all other claims. Finally, it seems that in general, the higher the exposure of a lender to a given host country, the smaller the reaction to host country shocks, as evidenced by the mostly negative coefficient on the interaction terms between host growth and host credit rating with exposure.
A cursory look at the results from the unrestricted model suggests that banks in home or lender countries respond similarly to certain shocks, not just in sign but also in magnitude. Thus, Table 4 , reports F-tests for a number of cross-lender restrictions. To summarize, we find that banks in home or lender countries respond similarly to host country shocks, exchange rate changes, and portfolio shocks. In other words, we cannot reject the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on host growth, on the interaction between host growth and exposure, on the change in ratings, on the interaction between change in ratings and exposure, on the crisis dummy, on the interaction between crisis and exposure, and finally, on the host country dummies are the same across home or lender countries. Furthermore, we also cannot reject the hypothesis that exchange rate changes affect all lenders in the same way. The first column of Table 5 (model 5.1) presents our preferred model for the whole sample period. Focusing on the subset of home country (j) variables, we find that France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. reduce claims in response to increased profit opportunities at home (i.e., in response to higher home growth), but only the coefficient on U.S. home growth is significant with a negative sign. Home growth has a positive and significant effect for Canada and Japan. With the exception of Germany and the UK, the home real interest rate has the expected negative impact. This variable is statistically significant for Canada, Japan, and the US.
Among the subset of host country variables, we find that the coefficient on host growth is positive and significant, showing support for the idea that foreign banks do respond to host country growth, increasing and decreasing credit over the cycle. However, we also find strong support for a "Calvo-Mendoza" effect, such that the higher the exposure of home country j to host country i, the less pro-cyclical (the less sensitive to host growth) is foreign bank lending.
The coefficient on host credit rating is positive and significant, while the interaction term of rating with exposure is negative, but not significant. Controlling for host country growth and risk rating, the crisis variable is not significant. Therefore, it does not appear that crisis episode cause any further decline in foreign bank claims. 20 Finally, the coefficient on private claims on other countries is positive and significant, indicating that changes elsewhere in the portfolio of lending banks might affect individual host countries.
Over the period of our sample, foreign bank penetration in Latin America increased significantly. Indeed while locally funded foreign bank loans (in local or foreign currency)
accounted for some 15 percent of total lending by banks operating in the region in 1995, this figure had risen to 38 percent by 2000 21 . Unfortunately, we cannot directly study whether the responsiveness of foreign banks changed as their brick and mortar investment (or local claims) in these countries increase, since the BIS statistics do not distinguish between direct foreign lending claims (funded in a BIS reporting country but lent in the region) and claims funded locally in foreign currency for the home-host country pairs that we analyze. However, an alternative way to investigate this issue is to compare the estimates of our model over the two sub-samples, namely, 1985-94 and 1995-2000. 20 This result is independent of whether we include the crisis dummy contemporaneously instead of lagged (see Table A .6) and it also holds when we discriminate between banking, currency, and twin crises (see Table A .7). 21 Salomon Smith Barney (2000) .
Over the period 1985-1994, host real growth plays a significant role in explaining movements in real claims. While the coefficient on home country real interest rates remains negative and significant, there is not much evidence of response of claims to home growth. The coefficient on the dummy variable capturing crises in the host country appears large and negative, but is insignificant. 22 Finally, the coefficient on the change in real claims on all other countries is both positive and significant indicating that the changes in claims on specific host countries are affected by across the board changes in the international portfolio.
Over the period 1995-2000, which coincides with the increase in brick and mortar operations of foreign banks in the region, we find that banks do not seem to pull out from host countries in crises. The coefficient on the crisis dummy is smaller in magnitude, and also insignificant. 23 Also, over this period, in contrast to the findings for the previous period, there is no evidence that changes in claims to other countries are transmitted to the host countries we focus on. Changes in credit ratings have a positive and significant impact on foreign bank lending, but foreign banks' responsiveness to this variable decreases as the degree of exposure rises.
Not only is it possible that foreign banks respond differently to home and host country economic conditions as the type of exposure to the region changes, but it is also feasible that their reaction depends asymmetrically on the nature of the shocks. In order to test this formally, we discriminate between positive and negative changes in host GDP growth, host credit ratings, and in all other claims. 24 Table 6 presents the results from this estimation for the overall sample, 22 This result continues to hold over the period 1985-1994 even when we include the crisis dummy contemporaneously or if we include separate dummies to identify banking, currency, and twin crises (see Tables A.6 and A.7). 23 As with the findings for the overall sample and the pre-1995 period, the results do not change if we enter the crisis dummy contemporaneously or if we analyze the impact of banking, currency, and twin crises, separately (see Tables  A.6 and A.7).
1985-2000. Note that we define negative changes in absolute terms so that we can interpret a negative coefficient as stating that larger drops in the variable in question lead to a decline in the growth of claims.
The results in Table 6 have some interesting potential interpretations. Specifically we find that while positive changes in host real GDP growth continue to have a positive and significant sign, the coefficient on negative host GDP growth is negative but not significant. The same is true for credit ratings: claims respond to upgrades and not to downgrades in credit ratings. However, the higher the exposure to the host country, the smaller the response of claims to upgrades in credit ratings, as indicated by the significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term between upgrades and exposure. On the other hand, both positive and negative changes in other country claims are statistically significant; negative changes have a much stronger impact on private claims than do positive changes, and that difference is statistically significant at standard significance levels. One interpretation of these results is that banks are more discriminate in the 'good times' than in the 'bad times'. In other words, during periods of positive growth, banks appear to increase claims more related to individual host country growth performance whereas in periods of negative growth, banks seem to retrench lending more across the board than in accordance with individual country factors.
A useful way of summarizing the importance of home, host, and portfolio shocks is provided in Table 7 , which details the percentage of the variance in private claims explained by each of these groups of variables. In other words, for each group of variables, we compute the increase in the adjusted R-squared, as a proportion of the total variance of the percentage change in claims explained by all variables. These statistics highlight the differences across the early versus the latter period which were discussed above: while changes in claims on all other countries explain a significant amount of the variance in the dependent variable (16%) in the 1985-1994 period, they play no role in explaining changes in private sector claims on host countries in Latin America during the later period. In addition, while home country conditions explain a large proportion (43%) of the variance in private claims during the 1985-1994 subperiod, their importance declines substantially to 9% in the latest sub-period. Host country conditions explain between 10 and 20 percent of the variance in claims in both periods, and, overwhelmingly, it is positive changes (positive growth and credit rating upgrades) that play the most significant role in explaining the changes in international financial claims.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we employ a comprehensive dataset to address a number of questions related to the stability of foreign bank claims. The data set is rich in two dimensions. From a cross-sectional perspective, we capture the behavior of banks from different home countries.
Banks from these countries vary in both their degree of exposure and in their importance as a source of credit to Latin America and to the particular host countries we analyze. From a timeseries perspective, our dataset allows us to focus on periods of tranquility as well as periods of crisis; on periods of lower foreign bank penetration and periods of strong "mortar and brick" (local) presence. With this more general dataset, we confirm particular previous findings in the literature, but more importantly we offer a set of new results.
The descriptive statistics presented in section II indicate that there is no clear evidence that foreign bank claims are less 'stable' than local credit. However, 'stability' clearly has a set of different dimensions and hence we prefer to refer more specifically to the particular determinants of the changes in foreign bank claims. Here we do find a set of significant effects.
In particular, we find that home country conditions matter (real home growth and real home interest rates), suggesting that there is some transmission of shocks from home to host countries, as claimed in previous work by Peek and Rosengren (2000a) and Goldberg (2001) . Also, we find evidence of cross-country spillovers since across the board shifts in and out of the international portfolio are significant in explaining movements in private claims to particular host countries.
Regarding the responsiveness to host country variables, we find that foreign bank claims generally react to host country variables (like host country growth and rating), but there is also convincing evidence that the overall level of exposure of home country j to host country i is important to the sensitivity of claims to these host country conditions. We find that the response of claims to both changes in credit ratings and host growth rates is smaller the larger the degree of exposure, suggesting less pro-cyclicality as exposure levels rise. Controlling for other host country variables, we find no evidence of significant retrenchment during host country crises, findings that are substantiated further by the descriptive statistics presented in Section II and which corroborate the results in Dages et al. (2000) , Goldberg (2001) , and Peek and Rosengren (2000b) . We also find that banks appear to be more sensitive to positive host country shocks than to negative ones. One possible interpretation of this result is that for positive shocks banks are more discriminate (responding to host country variables), whereas in the case of negative shocks, claims to a particular host country respond more to overall shifts in the international portfolio.
We also split the sample into two sub-periods, 1985-94 and 1995-2000 , and find interesting differences in the results. This split in the sample is motivated by the substantial increase in the 'brick and mortar' operations of foreign banks in our host countries over the second period. Over this period, we find evidence that host country factors account for a larger proportion of the explained variation in claims than home country variables. Furthermore, foreign banks become more discriminate over this period, and the importance of across the board shifts in the international portfolio is reduced.
We conclude that while foreign banks may be guilty of importing home country shocks and shocks from elsewhere through overall shifts in their international portfolio, on balance they continue to lend during crises, they have become more discriminate over time, and become less pro-cyclical as their exposure levels to a particular host country rise. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
deviations of foreign vis-à-vis domestic credit
This table reports the mean and standard deviation of the growth of foreign and domestic credit during the entire sample and during crises periods. T-tests are shown for the difference in mean and standard deviation between BIS 7 and domestic credit. BIS 7 reflects the growth of lending by all 7 lenders combined. Real domestic credit refers to the growth of lending by all financial institutions operating in the 10 host countries. Banking crises: chronology follows Caprio & Klingebiel (1999) , which documents episodes where much or all of bank capital was exhausted.
BIS-7 Real Claims
Currency crises: include episodes of forced changes in parity, abandonment of fixed exchange rate regimes, and those episodes identified by an index of exchange market pressure. The index is a standard deviation weighted average of exchange rate changes, short-term interest rate changes and reserve changes. A currency crisis is recorded when the index exceeds the critical threshold of 1.5 standard deviations above its mean. Twin crises: refers to episodes when banking and currency crises occur simultaneously. 
